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1 Introduction
Knowing the true size of labor supply responses has important implications for wel-
fare analysis (Eissa et al., 2008) and optimal taxation (Diamond and Saez, 2011, Im-
mervoll et al., 2011). One of the most topical questions in the long and comprehensive
literature on labor supply behavior is why macro elasticities are (substantially) larger
than micro ones (Chetty et al., 2011, Keane and Rogerson, 2012). While older explana-
tions focus on the use of representative agents and aggregation difficulties (Blanchard,
2007) or social multipliers (Alesina et al., 2006), more recent studies attribute differ-
ences to costs and frictions in labor supply adjustments, which standard microecono-
metric research designs can only imperfectly account for (Chetty, 2012). In principle,
structural micro-level labor supply models should be able to capture these adjustment
frictions (Aaberge et al., 1995, van Soest, 1995, Blundell et al., 2000).1 However, even
these widely used models typically produce labor supply elasticities well below those
found in macro studies, which immediately raises the question of why this is the case.
In this paper, we aim to answer this question by thoroughly scrutinizing state-of-
the-art micro labor supply models and their functioning. More specifically, in the first
part of the paper, we test whether the numerous modeling choices and assumptions to
be made when setting up structural labor supply models affect estimated elasticities.2
We check the internal validity of these models by running controlled experiments: we
set up and estimate 3,456 models each representing a different (plausible) combination
of commonly made modeling assumptions using two different micro datasets—one
for Germany and one for the US. Based upon the estimation results, we gather in-
sights into how robust the statistical fit of the models and the estimated labor supply
elasticities are with respect to the underlying assumptions.
Our results show that the models’ predictions do not depend on the specification
of the functional form or the inclusion of observed and unobserved preference het-
erogeneity, hours restrictions or stigma costs of welfare participation. However, we
find that the treatment of wages in the estimation procedure is crucial. For instance,
the choice between predicting wage rates for the full sample or only for non-workers
with missing wage information—both procedures are often used in the literature—
may more than double the estimated labor supply elasticities. We conclude that the
attention of previous sensitivity analyses has been mainly concentrated on less im-
portant factors while the main driving forces have been neglected, i.e. the interactions
1While recent research in labor economics typically relies on quasi-experimental methods to identify
causal effects of reforms, structural models are still necessary for policy analysis and especially out
of sample predictions (e.g., the ex-ante evaluation of a tax reform).
2Note that structural models are sometimes criticized for the large number of assumptions to be made
and the even larger number of possible combinations of these assumptions (Keane, 2010).
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between wages, working hours and preferences. This finding is even more relevant
given that most existing models (implicitly) assume exogeneity between the wage
equation and the labor supply decision, which is naturally quite a restrictive assump-
tion.3
Against this backdrop, in the second part of the paper, we propose a novel, flexible
estimation strategy to relax the strict exogeneity assumptions regarding wage rates
and work preferences. Estimation results show that there is indeed strong correla-
tion between both preferences and wages, as well as wages and hours of work. For
instance, wages are lower for part-time compared to full-time jobs and individuals
with higher wages are found to have higher preferences for leisure. The usual proce-
dure to estimate wages in the first step and assume a fixed wage rate (independent of
working hours) for every individual in the labor supply estimation ignores these cor-
relation patterns and drives the estimated elasticities towards zero. In our preferred
model, estimated labor supply elasticities are more than twice as high compared to
conventional models assuming zero correlation between work preferences and wages
(0.6 instead of 0.25). We conclude that the standard approach neglects important fac-
tors that determine a household’s response to wage changes, which yields too low
micro elasticities of labor supply. Consequently, part of the unexplained difference
between macro and structural micro elasticities may be due to model specification
errors regarding the wage treatment.
In this paper, we make three important contributions to the literature on labor sup-
ply estimation. First, there is little evidence on the functioning of structural labor
supply models in general. Moreover, if such studies exist, different models are not
estimated on the same dataset.4 In that respect, we run a controlled meta-analysis,
isolating the impact of the model assumptions on estimation outcomes. Second, our
analysis points to a hitherto neglected factor that strongly influences the estimated
labor elasticities: we show that the treatment of wages in labor supply estimations,
which is rarely theoretically motivated nor subject to robustness checks, crucially af-
fects the estimation results. In particular, we demonstrate that the commonly assumed
exogeneity between wage rates and labor supply decisions plays an important rule. To
tackle this issue, we propose a novel estimation strategy that relaxes this assumption
and additionally allows for correlation between work preferences and wages. There-
3Only little effort has been made thus far in the context of discrete choice labor supply models to
overcome this assumption. Aaberge et al. (1995), Breunig et al. (2008) and Blundell and Shephard
(2012) estimate preferences and wages simultaneously, in part also allowing for some correlation.
We discuss the differences to our approach, which is more general, in detail in Section 5.
4Existing surveys and meta-analyses focus on either the principles of alternative estimation strategies
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, Evers et al., 2008) or cross-country comparisons of empirical findings
(Bargain et al., 2014). Robustness checks in previous studies usually limit themselves to small
deviations in one or only few of the numerous modeling assumptions.
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fore, our approach is more flexible than previous models, while at the same time it
nests previous models and allows testing the assumption of zero correlation. Third,
our findings of significant correlations and resulting higher labor supply elasticities
have important policy implications as labor supply elasticities are key parameters
when evaluating or designing optimal tax benefit policies. For instance, Diamond
and Saez (2011) use an elasticity of 0.25, which is close to our estimate for the re-
strictive model, to derive an optimal top marginal tax rate of 72.7 %. However, an
elasticity of 0.6, as found in our most flexible model, reduces the optimal tax rate to
52.6 %, bringing it closer to actually observed values.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general
modeling framework and a short overview of the existing literature. Section 3 pro-
vides information on the used data and the modeling of the tax and benefit system.
In Section 4 we conduct our analysis of modeling assumptions and present first re-
sults. The new flexible estimation approach is introduced in Section 5, before Section
6 concludes.
2 Model and existing literature
The use of structural discrete choice labor supply estimations has become a standard
procedure in the empirical analysis of labor supply for both econometricians and pol-
icy makers (Bargain and Peichl, 2013). The first generation of labor supply models
relied on the assumption that the household’s utility is maximized over a continuous
set of working hours—known as Hausman approach (see Hausman, 1981). This proce-
dure has proven somewhat cumbersome when the budget set is non-convex, which
will often be the case in presence of the complicated tax and benefits systems in most
countries. Moreover, it has been shown that the estimated models are very sensitive
to the underlying wages (Ericson and Flood, 1997, Eklöf and Sacklén, 2000).
As the consistent estimation of this type of model relies on rather restrictive a priori
assumptions (see, e.g. MaCurdy et al., 1990, or Bloemen and Kapteyn, 2008, for
details), it has become increasingly popular to model the labor supply decision as
choice between a (finite) set of utility levels instead of deriving the marginal utility.
Starting with the works by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), van Soest (1995) and
Hoynes (1996), a wide range of different empirical specifications of these discrete choice
models has been applied. Comparing different levels of utility avoids the cumbersome
maximization process of Hausman-type models. We focus our analysis on the discrete
choice approach, given that it has become the standard procedure across the literature.
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2.1 General model
Structural labor supply estimations build on the assumption of the well-known neo-
classical labor supply model that decision makers maximize their utility by choosing
the optimal amount of hours of work (or the optimal job, more generally). As higher
working hours increase consumption but reduce leisure, households face a trade-off
between these two goods. Stated mathematically for individual n:
max
j
U
(
Cnj, Lj, enj
)
= max
j∈Jn
U
(
f
{
wnjhj
∣∣xnj, In} , T − hj, enj) (1)
where leisure Lj is denoted as difference between total time endowment T and work-
ing hours hj. Consumption Cnj depends on working hours, hourly wage rate wnj,
non-labor income In, household and job characteristics xnj and the tax benefit func-
tion f . Individual n faces the decision between a set of jobs Jn with working hours
hj and wages wnj, including non-participation denoted as j = 0 (with h0 = 0 and
wn0 = 0). Most models in the literature make the quite restrictive assumption that
wages are individual-specific and do not vary across alternatives.5 We assume a static
context, which implies that consumption equals disposable income as there is no fu-
ture utility from saving.
The true utility is only partly observable to the researcher while other components
enj are latent. Thus, we can write the utility of individual n choosing job type j as:
U
(
Cnj, Lj
∣∣xnj, βn,γn) = ϕ (Cnj, Lj∣∣xnj, βn,γn)+ enj (2)
The observed part ϕ
(
Cnj, Lj
∣∣xnj, βn,γn) is determined by consumption and leisure,
characteristics xnj, individual preferences βn and labor market conditions γn that
capture the availability of job type j. One could think of these labor market character-
istics γn as measuring individual-specific fixed costs, search costs for part-time jobs or
rigidities regarding working hours, for example. The unobserved taste variation enj is
assumed to be i.i.d. and follow the extreme value type I distribution with cumulative
distribution function F(e) = exp (− exp(−e)). McFadden (1974) has shown that the
probability of individual n choosing a job of type i is subsequently given by:
P
(
Uni > Unj, ∀j 6= i
∣∣xn, βn,γn) = exp (ϕ {Cni, Li∣∣xni, βn,γn})
∑s∈Jn exp
(
ϕ
{
Cns, Ls
∣∣xns, βn,γn}) (3)
5An exception are the models by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and follow-ups. We further
loosen this restriction in Section 5 when estimating wages and preferences jointly.
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Assuming that individuals take labor market conditions as given, we can rewrite:
P
(
Uni > Unj, ∀j 6= i
∣∣xn, βn,γn) = exp (v {Cni, Li∣∣xni, βn}) g (i∣∣xni,γn)
∑s∈Jn exp
(
v
{
Cns, Ls
∣∣xns, βn}) g (s∣∣xns,γn) (4)
with v(Cnj, Lnj) as systematic utility function and g(j) as frequency of feasible jobs
with type j. In words, the individual choice probability is given as the systematic
utility part weighted by the availability of jobs with type j. In the following, we
discuss the specification of v(·) and g(·) and the estimation procedure.
2.2 Estimation
Econometrically, the discrete choice approach boils down to the representation of the
labor supply decision in a random utility model. In the very basic model, the theoreti-
cal setup implies that the household’s decision satisfies the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) property (Luce, 1959). In other words, the preference between two
alternatives does not depend on the presence of a third one. While this assumption
may seem rather restrictive at first glance, Dagsvik and Strøm (2004) and Train (2009)
show that it is well in line with economic intuition and even less restrictive than the
necessary assumptions to estimate continuous hours models. However, the IIA as-
sumption is no longer needed as soon as additional random effects are incorporated
in the model (see Section 2.3).
Identification. As in every structural estimation problem, it is crucial to impose a
specific functional form for both v(Cnj, Lnj) and g(j) to obtain consistent estimates of
βn and γn. Van Soest et al. (2002) show that semi-parametric specifications also yield
consistent results. We further discuss different assumptions that are frequently used
below. As consumption is a function of working hours and thus leisure, identification
of preference parameters relies on (a) the variation in working hours hj, hourly wages
wnj, non-labor income In and other characteristics xnj and (b) the fact that the tax
function f (wnjhj, In) is highly non-linear in hj and wnj. This also implies that labor
market conditions γn can only be separated and identified on the assumption of a
specific functional form (Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006).
In addition to this, the vast majority of the literature also assumes that preferences
βn and labor market conditions γn may depend on individual characteristics, but are
independent of the wage rate wnj. Thus, it is assumed that:
Corr
(
βn, wnj
∣∣xnj) = 0 Corr (γn, wnj∣∣xnj) = 0 (5)
6
The main reason for this assumption is that it reduces the computational burden
substantially and makes the estimation more convenient. However, assuming
exogeneity seems quite restrictive, as unobserved ability, for instance, is most likely
positively correlated with both wage rates and work preferences. Therefore, we test
and relax this assumption in Section 5.
In order to estimate the preference coefficients, one has to evaluate both functions
v and g for every household n = 1, . . . , N and every choice category within the choice
set Jn. Given the different income levels, the model can be estimated via maximum
likelihood. The derivation of the (log)-likelihood function is straightforward (McFad-
den, 1974). However, some modeling assumptions have to be made, as well as several
possible extensions to this simple setup.
2.3 Model setup
Choice set. The first decision in the estimation relates to the construction of the
choice set (see Aaberge et al., 2009, for a detailed discussion of this issue). Most
authors simply pick a set of representative levels of hours of work and assume (small)
identical choice sets for the whole population. In our analysis, we follow the literature
and assume that households with a single decision maker face seven possible labor
supply states, i.e. either non-participation or working 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 or 60 hours
per week. Couple households are assumed to face 72 alternatives.6
Functional form of the systematic utility. As the discrete choice approach relies
on the comparison of different utility levels, it is crucial to determine the form of
the systematic utility function. In theoretical terms, the function v represents the
direct utility function of the household. Most applications rely on either a translog,
a quadratic or a Box-Cox transformed utility specification. However, several other
choices are possible.
Heterogeneity in preferences. Observed heterogeneity in the labor supply behavior
can be rather easily introduced in the context of structural labor supply models. The
preference coefficients of the direct utility function are usually interacted with some
observed household characteristics, such as age or the presence of children, as taste
shifters.
6Note that the results are generally not sensitive to the number of choices (e.g., 4 vs. 7 vs. 13) or the
exact value assigned to each category – see, e.g., Bargain et al. (2014).
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Moreover, including also unobserved heterogeneity overcomes the IIA assumption
as it allows for unobservable variation in preferences between choice alternatives.
There are two main ways to do so: in most applied works, either a random coefficient
model (van Soest, 1995) or a latent class model (Hoynes, 1996) is assumed. While the
former assumes a set of coefficients to be (multivariate) normally distributed, the
latter assumes a set of discrete mass points for the estimated coefficients. Keane and
Wasi (2012) discuss the performance of both approaches. We focus on the random
coefficient approach as it has become standard across the literature.
Welfare stigma and benefit take-up. While the model as described thus far assumes
that households only build their preferences with respect to the levels of consumption
and leisure, their utility may also depend on the source of income. For example,
the participation in welfare programs may be connected to an unobservable stigma
that affects the household’s utility and prevents some households from taking up
benefits (Moffitt, 1983). In the discrete choice context, this can be incorporated by
accounting for the potential disutility from welfare participation and expanding the
choice set such that the household explicitly chooses between benefit take-up and
non-participation (Hoynes, 1996, Keane and Moffitt, 1998).
Fixed costs and hours restrictions. Moreover, van Soest (1995) argues that working
part-time could also be connected with an unobservable disutility, because part-time
jobs may exhibit higher search costs. Euwals and van Soest (1999) extend this idea by
introducing fixed costs of work, which have since been used in several applications.
While both approaches help to explain the observed labor market outcomes, their
rational remains rather ad hoc. Aaberge et al. (1995) provide a more convenient theo-
retical framework that delivers a structural interpretation of fixed costs and the utility
connected to certain hours alternatives. In their model, households choose between
(latent) job offers that not only differ regarding the working hours, but also in terms
of availability, wages and non-monetary attributes.
2.4 Wage imputation procedure
In addition to the specification of the utility function, there are important modeling
assumptions regarding the wage imputation. In order to calculate the disposable
income for the different choice alternatives, one needs information on the hourly wage
rates. While for actual workers the wage rate can be calculated by gross earnings and
hours of work (we use standardized working hours to reduce the potential division
bias, see Borjas, 1980, and Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999, for a discussion), the wage
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information is typically missing for non-workers. The first decision is how to deal
with missing wages in the estimation process. In practice, wages are either estimated
beforehand and treated as given within the estimation of the labor supply model or
wages and preferences are estimated jointly. In addition, one has to decide whether
the estimated wage rates are used only if wages are not observed or for the full sample
(see MaCurdy et al., 1990, for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
both approaches). In either case, one can ignore or explicitly include potential sample
selection issues in the observed wages.
After estimating the wage equation, another important question is whether the
potential errors in the wage rate prediction are incorporated in the labor supply es-
timation. Especially when using predicted wages for the full sample, the “new” dis-
tribution of wages will typically have a significantly lower variance and the predicted
wage will differ considerably from the observed one, at least for some workers. Thus,
ignoring the error when predicting wage rates, which is still done in practice, leads to
inconsistent estimates. The standard procedure to incorporate wage prediction errors
is to integrate over the whole estimated wage distribution and thus integrating out
the wage prediction error during the estimation process (van Soest, 1995). One ap-
proximation used in some applications is to simply add a single random draw to the
predicted wage rates (Bargain et al., 2014). While this procedure lacks a theoretical
rationale, it substantially reduces the computational burden of the estimation.
2.5 Estimation approach
The named extensions especially regarding the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity
and the incorporation of wage prediction errors complicate the estimation procedure
and lead to the more general representation as mixed logit model (Train, 2009). Taking
the most general specification as reference, the likelihood function can be written as:
L =
N
∏
n=1
+∞∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
exp (vni {·|wˆni, βn}) g (i|γn)
∑j∈Jn exp
(
vnj
{·|wˆnj, βn}) g (j|γn) f (βn,γn) f (wˆn)dβndγndwˆn (6)
where i ∈ Jn denotes the alternative chosen by individual n. The likelihood contribu-
tions not only depend on the systematical utility function, but also on the availability
of the choice alternatives, denoted by g(i). This setup implies that the availability
of choice alternatives can be separated from the systematic utility, which is a reason-
able assumption at least for labor markets in industrialized countries. As the pref-
erences may also include unobserved heterogeneity, the probability that household n
maximizes its utility at choice alternative i has to be integrated over the possible set
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of coefficients (βn,γn). Similarly, the individual likelihood contributions have to be
integrated over the range of possible wage predictions wˆnj. As both variables will
typically not be uniformly distributed, the choice probability has to be weighted by
the probability density of the random components.
The model as written down in equation (6) is very general and less restrictive than
the conditional logit setup. In turn, it is no longer possible to find an analytical
solution. Train (2009) proposes the use of maximum simulated likelihood methods
instead. In order to retrieve the simulated likelihood, the double integral has to be
approximated and averaged over r = 1, . . . , R random draws from the distributions
of (βn,γn) and wˆnj. The simulated log-likelihood is subsequently given by:
ln(SL) =
N
∑
n=1
ln
 1R R∑r=1
exp
(
vni
{
·
∣∣∣wˆ(r)ni , β(r)n }) g (i∣∣∣γ(r)n )
∑j∈Jn exp
(
vnj
{
·
∣∣∣wˆ(r)nj , β(r)n }) g (j∣∣∣γ(r)n )
 (7)
When the number of draws goes to infinity, the simulated log-likelihood in (7) con-
verges to the log-likelihood of the model denoted in (6). Instead of relying on conven-
tional random draws, we approximate the likelihood function using pseudo-random
Halton sequences. This reduces the number of draws needed to ensure stable results
as Halton sequences cover the desired distribution more evenly (Train, 2009).7
2.6 Existing literature
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the empirical specification of several popular
models that have been applied in recent years. As one can see, mainly three utility
functions have been used, i.e. either a translog, a quadratic or a Box-Cox transformed
specification. As the Stone-Geary function can be interpreted as a simplification of
the translog or the Box-Cox utility function, only the higher-degree polynomials used
in van Soest et al. (2002) stand out from the list. Their approach can be seen as ap-
proximation to a non-parametric specification of the utility function. The inclusion of
observed heterogeneity shows a similar picture. All studies allow for observed het-
erogeneity in the preferences for leisure, whereas fewer studies allow for preference
heterogeneity regarding consumption. The evidence on unobserved heterogeneity is
somewhat more mixed, just like the inclusion of heterogeneity in fixed costs and the
potential stigma from welfare participation.
As working hours are typically concentrated in only few hours categories, most
authors include in their models fixed costs of working, hours restrictions, or both.
7Details on the estimation procedure can be found in Löffler (2013).
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Table 1: Different model specifications
Utility Heterogeneity* Welfare
Paper Function Observed Unobs. Stigma Constraints
Aaberge et al. (1995, 2009) Box-Cox L — — FC, HR
Aaberge et al. (1999) Box-Cox L, FC — — FC, HR
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) Box-Cox L, FC — — FC, HR
Dagsvik et al. (2011) Box-Cox L, FC — — FC, HR
Blundell and Shephard (2012) Box-Cox L, C, S, FC C, S Yes FC
van Soest (1995) Translog L —/L† — —/HR
Euwals and van Soest (1999) Translog L, FC L — FC
van Soest and Das (2001) Translog L, FC L — FC
Flood et al. (2004) Translog L, L2, S L, L2, S Yes —
Haan (2006) Translog L, C —/C — HR
Flood et al. (2007) Translog L, C, FC, S L, C, FC, S Yes FC
Hoynes (1996) Stone-Geary L, S L, S Yes —/FC
van Soest et al. (2002) Polynomial L L — FC
Keane and Moffitt (1998) Quadratic L, S L, S Yes —
Blundell et al. (1999, 2000) Quadratic L, C, FC C, S Yes FC
Bargain et al. (2014) Quadratic L, C, FC C — FC
* L and C denote heterogeneity in preferences for leisure and consumption, respectively. S de-
notes the disutility from welfare participation. FC refers to fixed costs of working and HR to
hours restrictions.
† Robustness checks and alternative model specifications are separated by slashes.
Table 2: Wage imputation methods
Estimation Sample Prediction
Paper Approach Selection Imputation Error
Aaberge et al. (1995, 2009) Simultaneous — Full sample —
Aaberge et al. (1999) Simultaneous — Full sample —
Keane and Moffitt (1998) Simult./Two step* — Non-workers —
van Soest et al. (2002) Simultaneous — Non-workers Integrated out
Blundell and Shephard (2012) Simult./Two step — Non-workers Integrated out
van Soest (1995) Two step Yes Non-workers —/Integrated out
Euwals and van Soest (1999) Two step Yes Non-workers Integrated out
Blundell et al. (1999, 2000) Two step Yes Non-workers Integrated out
van Soest and Das (2001) Two step Yes Non-workers Integrated out
Haan (2006) Two step Yes Non-workers —
Flood et al. (2007) Two step Yes Non-workers —/Integrated out
Dagsvik et al. (2011) Two step Yes Non-workers —
Hoynes (1996) Two step Yes Full sample —
Flood et al. (2004) Two step Yes Full sample —
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) Two step Yes Full sample Integrated out
Bargain et al. (2014) Two step Yes Full sample Random draw
* Robustness checks and alternative model specifications are separated by slashes.
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Fixed costs and hours restrictions can also be interpreted as measures for the avail-
ability of the respective choice alternatives (Aaberge et al., 2009). Less than half of the
models explicitly allowed for stigma effects and non-take-up of welfare benefits. This
is interesting due to the common finding that the benefit participation rate deviates
substantially from full take-up. Thus, models that do not explicitly account for the
potential disutility are expected to over-predict the number of recipients.
Less variation can be found in terms of the model’s treatment of wages. While
most studies estimate wages and the labor supply decision in a two-step procedure,
only the models of Aaberge et al. (1995, and follow-ups), Keane and Moffitt (1998),
van Soest et al. (2002) and Blundell and Shephard (2012) apply a simultaneous max-
imum likelihood procedure. In turn, these models neglect potential sample selection
issues when estimating wages. As can be seen, there is no consensus in the literature
whether predicted wages should be used only for individuals with unobserved wages
or for the full sample, the advantage of the latter choice is there is eventually only one
wage distribution. Regarding the handling of the wage prediction errors, it becomes
increasingly common practice to incorporate and integrate out the errors during the
estimation.
3 Data
The baseline estimations in this paper are performed on the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), a representative household panel survey for Germany (Wagner et al.,
2007). SOEP includes now more than 24,000 individuals in around 11,000 households.
We use the 2008 wave of SOEP, which provides household data from 2008, as well as
data on the labor supply behavior and incomes from the preceding year (i.e. the
year before the Great Recession). We rely on the tax and transfer system of 2007,
focusing our analysis on the working age population and thus excluding individuals
younger than 17 or above the retirement age of 65 from our estimations. Our sample
is further restricted to those households where at least one decision maker can adjust
her labor supply. Therefore, we exclude households where all decision makers are
self-employed (since it is difficult to measure true hours and wages for those), civil
servants8 or in the military service. Moreover, our subsample includes some house-
holds with more than two adults, which mainly includes adult children living with
their parents. We exclude these young adults from the estimation as it is unclear how
their consumption and utility are determined (Dagsvik et al., 2011).
8Tenured civil servants cannot freely adjust the weekly working hours. Note that we keep all other
public sector employees.
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As the labor supply decision is known to be rather heterogeneous across population
subgroups, we separate the sample into five distinct demographical subpopulations.
The first two groups are defined as single men and single women with or without
dependent children. Our estimation subsample contains 779 households with single
males and 1,065 households with single females. In addition, we specify three dif-
ferent kinds of couple households. First, we define 688 couple households in which
the male partner has a flexible labor supply but the female partner is inflexible (e.g.
due to self-employment or exclusion restrictions regarding the age). Second, we have
1,042 couple households in which the male partner has an inflexible labor supply but
the female partner is flexible. In order to model the household labor supply decision
of these “semi-flexible” couple households, we assume that the flexible partner faces
his or her labor supply decision conditional on the labor supply behavior of the in-
flexible partner. Third, our sample includes 3,099 couple households in which both
partners are flexible regarding their labor supply behavior.
For the computation of consumption levels for the different choice categories, we
rely on IZA’s policy simulation model IZAΨMOD (v3.0.0), which incorporates a very
detailed representation of the German tax and benefit system (see Peichl et al., 2010,
for a comprehensive documentation). Some of the estimated models would require
applying the tax and benefit system for every possible wage rate for every household
in every step of the numerical likelihood maximization, although doing so would
slow down the estimation process substantially. To avoid this cumbersome procedure,
we approximate the tax and benefit system by using a highly flexible second-degree
polynomial that transforms monthly gross earnings into disposable income while
controlling for a rich set of household characteristics, as well as all available sources
of non-labor incomes. The resulting R2 shows a very good fit of more than 99 % for
all population subgroups but single women (only 97 % for them), which confirms that
our approximation performs rather well. In order to also allow for unobserved tax
determinants, we balance the predicted amounts of consumption by a single random
draw for each household; otherwise, we would mistakenly reduce the variance in the
consumption variable. The results are very much in line with those taking advantage
of the full representation of the tax and transfer system, we are thus confident that
the approximation does not affect our findings.
As a robustness check, we compare our results obtained with German data to re-
sults for the USA. For this, we use data from IPUMS-CPS which is an integrated
dataset of the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for 2007. In order to calculate
income and payroll taxes, we use NBER’s simulation model TAXSIM.
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4 Empirical results
Despite the presence of some robustness checks in the literature (see tables 1 and
2), these checks are usually narrowed down to a small deviation in just one of the
modeling assumptions. By contrast, Evers et al. (2008) and Bargain and Peichl (2013)
perform meta-analyses of labor supply models comparing estimated labor supply
elasticities for different countries and explain them mainly by study characteristics. In
either case, it is difficult to draw detailed and general conclusions on the specification
of discrete choice models from the reported results. We overcome these difficulties by
estimating a large variety of different modeling assumptions in a controlled environ-
ment using the same data. The estimation results allow us to determine how sensitive
the estimated outcomes are with respect to the specification and the wage imputation
procedure used in the model.
4.1 Analysis setup
For our analysis, we combine frequently used modeling assumptions and estimate all
sensible combinations of these specifications. We estimate 3,456 different model spec-
ifications for the five distinct labor supply types, which leads us to 17,280 maximum
likelihood estimations. However, the sample of estimation results is reduced because
not all models did converge in a reasonable time span as we applied an automatic
routine to find initial values and estimate this large number of models. We drop from
our analysis those estimation results that did not converge. Depending on the labor
supply group we lose up to 6 percent of our sample and end up with 16,730 different
estimation results.9
Table 3 shows the different specifications and the number of converged estimation
results and reads as follows. We estimate 1,152 distinct models with a Box-Cox trans-
formed utility specification for each of the five labor supply groups, although only
1,022 estimation results for single males and 1,132 for single females are included in
our sample. Regardless of the functional form of the utility function, 1,152 of the
estimated models neglect any kind of hours restrictions or fixed costs, 1,152 models
include part-time restrictions and 1,152 models account for fixed costs of work.
In order to make the estimation results comparable across the different labor supply
groups, we standardize the statistical fit and the estimated elasticities within a labor
supply group. We subsequently pool the data and regress the estimation results on
the different modeling assumptions (mainly represented as dummy variables). We
9We drop models that did not converge after 100 iterations of Stata’s maximum likelihood implemen-
tation. Of course, more complex models take longer to converge. Apart from that, we do not find
systematic effects of different types of assumptions on the probability of not converging.
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Table 3: Estimated model combinations
Number of Converged Models*
Model Parameter Option N SgM SgF CoM CoF CoMF
Utility function Box-Cox 1,152 1,022 1,132 951 1,148 1,029
Quadratic 1,152 1,152 1,151 1,152 1,133 1,152
Translog 1,152 1,125 1,144 1,148 1,148 1,143
Welfare stigma No 1,728 1,642 1,701 1,607 1,713 1,664
Yes 1,728 1,657 1,726 1,644 1,716 1,660
Hours restrictions — 1,152 1,091 1,141 1,040 1,131 1,109
Fixed costs 1,152 1,064 1,137 1,061 1,149 1,063
Part-time 1,152 1,144 1,149 1,150 1,149 1,152
Number of Halton draws — 288 288 288 283 288 286
10 1,584 1,440 1,564 1,429 1,559 1,456
5 1,584 1,571 1,575 1,539 1,582 1,582
Observed heterogeneity — 864 835 864 822 860 834
in C only 864 827 862 834 861 822
in L only 864 827 858 798 859 836
in L, C 864 810 843 797 849 832
Unobserved heterogeneity — 576 574 571 566 570 574
in C only 864 863 853 846 862 863
in L only 576 520 574 523 569 541
in L, C 864 804 856 795 854 791
with correl. 576 538 573 521 574 555
Wage imputation Full sample 1,728 1,652 1,708 1,635 1,710 1,655
Non-workers 1,728 1,647 1,719 1,616 1,719 1,669
Wage prediction error — 1,296 1,217 1,293 1,219 1,291 1,245
1 random draw 1,296 1,236 1,291 1,203 1,284 1,239
Integrated out 864 846 843 829 854 840
Total 3,456 3,299 3,427 3,251 3,429 3,324
* Single males (females) are denoted by SgM (SgF). Couples where only the male (female) partner
has a flexible labor supply are denoted by CoM (CoF). CoMF denotes fully flexible couples.
The column N refers to the number of possible model combinations for each choice whereas
the subsequent columns report the number of converged models.
measure the statistical fit by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of the models.
To retrieve (uncompensated) labor supply elasticities, we increase the own-wage rates
by ten percent and simulate the labor supply reaction to this wage change.
4.2 Estimation results
The results of these meta-regressions can be found in table 4. As the dependent
variables have been standardized, the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Our re-
sults show, e.g. that using a quadratic utility function increases the AIC by 12 % of
a standard deviation in the sample and thereby worsens the statistical fit. These re-
sults have to be compared to a rather simple reference model using a translog utility
15
Table 4: Marginal impact of modeling assumptions (SOEP)
Fit 10 % own wage elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.015 0.004
(0.023) (0.028) (0.062) (0.053)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.116∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.026) (0.040) (0.035) (0.034)
Welfare stigma 0.968∗∗∗ 0.045 0.065 0.065
(0.076) (0.062) (0.047) (0.042)
Number of Halton draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours restrictions
Part-time restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.070) (0.039) (0.042)
Fixed costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.067) (0.040) (0.041)
Observed heterogeneity
in C only -0.335∗∗∗ -0.049 0.060∗∗ 0.043∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.022) (0.023)
in L only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.048 0.045∗∗ 0.046∗
(0.061) (0.038) (0.021) (0.023)
in C and L -0.475∗∗∗ 0.016 0.012 0.013
(0.070) (0.044) (0.019) (0.022)
Unobserved heterogeneity
in C only 0.005 -0.006 -0.059∗ -0.051
(0.014) (0.023) (0.032) (0.030)
in L only 0.005 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.037
(0.013) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027)
in C and L -0.041∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.069∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.013) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)
in C and L (with correl.) -0.119∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Wage imputation
Full sample, no correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.121∗∗∗ 2.235∗∗∗ 2.240∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.094) (0.091) (0.086)
Full sample, error integrated out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗ 1.406∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.119) (0.123) (0.124)
Full sample, 1 random draw -0.104∗∗ 0.071 0.131 0.121
(0.049) (0.062) (0.093) (0.088)
Non-workers, error integrated out 0.000 0.048 0.040 0.041
(0.067) (0.063) (0.041) (0.041)
Non-workers, 1 random draw 0.070 -0.230∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.094) (0.087) (0.087)
Labor supply types Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16730 13219 13219 13219
R2 0.854 0.849 0.870 0.881
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the indi-
vidual wage rates by 10 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses.
Dependent variables have been standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an in-
crease of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is negatively related to
the statistical fit of the model—the better the fit, the lower the AIC. Standard er-
rors clusted by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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function, neglecting observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences as well as
fixed costs of working, hours restrictions or any stigma from welfare participation.
In this reference model, we use observed wage rates for actual workers and predict
wages for non-workers without incorporating the wage prediction error in the labor
supply estimation. We find many statistically significant relationships. However, the
presented standard errors are not bootstrapped, given that this would render our sen-
sitivity analysis computationally infeasible. Bootstrapped standard errors would be
substantially larger than those presented. As the coefficients are measured in stan-
dard deviations, only those of at least one standard deviation (in absolute values) are
also economically interesting. We summarize the key findings below.
Goodness of fit. Although the statistical fit is usually not the main outcome of in-
terest, our results show several interesting patterns for future applications (see table
4). First, the choice of the utility function does not systematically improve or worsen
the statistical fit. Our analysis confirms the usual finding that the implementation
of hours restrictions, fixed costs and observed preference heterogeneity clearly help
to explain the labor supply choices. Estimating random coefficients models that also
allow for unobserved heterogeneity yields little value-added compared to the compu-
tational burden of the estimation. The results regarding the wage imputation show
that these specification decisions also affect the statistical fit of the model substantially.
Predicting wages not only for non-workers but also for the full sample improves the
fit significantly. However, this is unsurprising as it demonstrates how much of the
variation in the data is lost by using predicted instead of actual wages for the full
sample when not accounting for errors in the wage rate prediction.
More generally, our results show that apart from the implementation of fixed costs
or hours restrictions, there is hardly a single modeling assumption that guarantees
a good fit. Instead, several small issues help to explain the observed labor market
outcomes and add up to a good fit.
Labor supply elasticities. Even more important than the statistical fit is whether
specific modeling assumptions systematically influence the out-of-sample predictions
when simulating policy or wage changes. Figure 1 shows the distribution of labor
supply elasticities across the converged models for the four labor supply types.10 The
graph shows considerable variation across the different modeling setups (within a
specific labor supply group as well as across groups). In line with the literature, we
find that the estimated elasticities are rather robust regarding the specification of the
10We aggregated semi-flex couples and couples with two flexible partners to calculate elasticities.
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utility function, as well as the implementation of observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity. This is reassuring as it shows that the frequently applied specifications do
not restrict the labor supply decision a priori. The only (weak) exception seems to be
the implementation of hours restrictions or fixed costs, which tend to drive extensive
elasticities up. This finding supports the view that jobs with very few weekly work-
ing hours are harder to find than regular part-time or full-time jobs. It is thus more
likely that people switch from non-participation to 20 or 40 than to 5 or 10 hours of
work when accounting for this fact, which leads to higher elasticities at the extensive
margin.
Figure 1: Labor supply elasticities of converged models
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Substantially more of the variation can be explained when analyzing the impact of
the wage imputation and the handling of wage prediction errors. Our results hold
the important message that this part of the model specification is much more rel-
evant to the estimated elasticities than the utility specification. For instance, using
predicted wages not only for non-workers but also for the full sample roughly dou-
bles the estimated elasticities when not accounting for the wage prediction error. This
substantial difference can be explained by the fact that predicting wages for the full
sample reduces the variance of the wage distribution substantially. To explain the ob-
served working hours with less variation in wages and thus income and consumption,
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the implied elasticities have to increase. Accounting for wage prediction errors and
integrating them out during the estimation markedly reduces the difference. Inter-
estingly, the results differ substantially depending on whether a single random draw
or higher numbers are used. The ad hoc procedure of adding a single random draw
tends to cancel out the effect of a full sample prediction. In contrast, correcting for
the wage prediction error tends to reduce the elasticities, but we still observe the es-
timated elasticities to be significantly higher than those in which the wage rates were
only imputed for non-workers.
Robustness. We performed a wide range of robustness checks to confirm that our
results are not special to the used data and methods. In particular, we also used a
different wave from the same data set and performed our analysis also using data
from the CPS for the US (see table 8 in the online appendix). In addition to the
marginal impact (holding all other specification details constant), we investigated the
partial impact of the modeling assumptions (in table 9 in the online appendix), which
only shows the differences in means due to the specific assumptions (e.g. mean of
elasticities using a translog utility specification vs. mean of elasticities using other
functional forms, irrespective of other modeling issues). The results we obtained
were qualitatively the same. We also checked the robustness regarding the calculation
of elasticities and found no differences whether we simulated 1 % or 10 % changes in
the own-wage rate (table 10). Also switching the calculation of the elasticities from
aggregated to mean, median or other quantile measures did not affect our findings
(tables 11 and 12).
Summary. Our results partly confirm previous findings in the literature. While the
empirical specification of the systematic utility function has an impact on the statis-
tical fit, we find only little differences in the estimated elasticities. It thus may be
justified to rely on simpler model setups when the computational burden is a ma-
jor concern. However, the majority of applied robustness checks focus on the effects
of different utility specifications and usually ignore how the underlying wage treat-
ment may influence the results. We find that these assumptions explain much more
variation in outcomes than the specification of the utility function. Most previous
robustness checks have thus concentrated on issues of secondary order. Instead, more
attention should be paid to the wage imputation and the handling of wage prediction
errors. Modeling choices regarding the wage handling may thus also explain part of
the large variation found in labor supply studies.
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5 Joint estimation of wages and preferences
Our analysis shows that the wage imputation procedure and the handling of the wage
prediction error have a huge impact on estimated labor supply elasticities. Nonethe-
less, it is common practice to estimate the labor supply decision conditional on ob-
served or predicted wages. Wage rates are estimated beforehand and treated as ex-
ogenous within the labor supply estimation. This procedure reduces the computa-
tional burden, but is naturally rather restrictive. While there are some Hausman-type
studies that loosen this fairly strong assumption and find correlation between wages
and hours of work (Moffitt, 1984, Tummers and Woittiez, 1991), only little effort has
been taken so far in the context of discrete choice labor supply models. Aaberge
et al. (1995) and follow-ups estimate labor supply on a random choice set based upon
draws from hours and wage distributions they estimate simultaneously. Breunig et al.
(2008) and Blundell and Shephard (2012) assume a fixed individual-specific wage rate
but allow one specific preference parameter to be correlated with the error term of
the wage equation. Although this accounts for at least some interaction between pref-
erences and wages, it still assumes that the labor supply decision is exogenous to the
wage rate. Moreover, the correlation structure is rather arbitrary and restrictive. For
instance, one may think of potential correlation between the wage rate and several
different preference parameters.
This issue is especially important as we expect that correlations between preferences
and wages may drive the estimated elasticities. Consider two identical workers with
the same observed characteristics but different unobservable productivity and thus
wage rates. Suppose in case A that there are indeed no feedback effects between
wages and preferences. Subsequently both workers will have the same preferences
and their reaction to wage increases will only differ due to their initial consumption
level. Now consider case B, in which preferences for, say, consumption are negatively
correlated with productivity. Hence, the less productive worker has now a higher
preference for consumption, whereas preferences of the more productive worker stay
constant. As the less productive worker now values consumption and income more
compared to case A, it follows that his labor supply elasticity increases. We show this
mechanism in a simple model at the end of Appendix A.
5.1 Estimation setup
We propose a very flexible estimation strategy that overcomes the restrictive exogene-
ity assumptions of the standard estimation procedure in equation (5) to examine this
issue empirically. More specific, we allow the wage rate to depend on hours of work
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and preferences for leisure and consumption to be correlated with the error term
of the wage equation. However, to render this model feasible, we have to impose
some distributional assumptions on the random terms. More precisely, preferences
for consumption and leisure and the wage equation residuals are assumed to follow a
multivariate normal distribution. We assume that wages are log-normally distributed
and estimate them on tenure, education and dummies for having migrated, living
in East Germany, being handicapped or working either part-time or overtime. Labor
supply and wages are estimated jointly using a full information maximum likelihood
framework:
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ln
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R
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}
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(8)
where U denotes the subset of unemployed individuals and β(r)n , e
(r)
w,n are the (ran-
domly drawn) preference coefficients and the error terms of the log-wage equation,
respectively. φ(·) is the density of a standard normal distribution. This framework re-
lates to the estimation approach outlined in Blundell and Shephard (2012), although
we approximate the likelihood function using a set of R Halton draws instead of
Gaussian Hermite quadrature. Fitting preferences and wages jointly makes it possible
to estimate both the influence of hours of work on the wage rate and the variance-
covariance matrix of preferences and wages. See Appendix A for details on the model.
Identification. In order to separate and identify both effects properly, we use the
actual wage equation residual for workers whose wage rate is observed (subset E),
whereas we use multivariate normally distributed Halton sequences to integrate over
a set of possible wage equation errors for unemployed individuals. While the stan-
dard model assumes preferences and wages to be exogenous, we allow for (multivari-
ate normal) correlation patterns. This makes our estimation approach more flexible,
but in turn places another functional form assumption on the estimated covariances.
Chiou and Walker (2007) show that the use of small numbers of draws may mask
identification of mixed logit models. We therefore run our estimations using different
numbers of draws. While most studies rely on even fewer than 50 (Halton) draws, we
use up to 4,000 Halton draws to check the robustness of our results. Reassuringly the
estimated variance-covariance matrix is robust to the approximation in terms of both
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the coefficients and their standard errors with as few as 50 draws. Table 7 in Appendix
B shows the estimation results for our most flexible model using different numbers of
draws, varying between 10 and 4,000, indicating that the results are remarkably stable
when using at least 50 draws.
5.2 Empirical results
Due to computational constraints, we only estimate our model for the subset of single
females in our sample. Table 5 summarizes the results regarding the correlation pat-
terns for this group. We do not present the complete table of estimates here to save
space. Full results can be found in Appendix B (table 6).11 The different models are
defined as follows:
(1) Common two-step estimation assuming wages as exogenous.
(2) Estimates preferences and wages jointly.
(3) Extends (2) by allowing for hours-dependent wages.
(4) Extends (3) by additionally allowing for correlation between wages and prefer-
ences for consumption.
(5) Extends (4) by additionally allowing for correlation between wages and taste for
leisure.
Our results show that there is indeed correlation between wages and hours of work.
For single women, working part-time yields a wage decrease of roughly 7 % on aver-
age compared to a typical full-time job (see column (5)). The results are statistically
significant different from zero at the 5 % level. Working 50 or more hours a week
is also connected to a decrease in hourly wages compared to full-time employment,
although the effect is economically small and statistically not different from zero.
These findings indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between wages and hours
of work, and thereby confirm the findings of Moffitt (1984) within the classical con-
tinuous hours approach. The estimated variance-covariance matrix between wages
and preferences for consumption and leisure shows that there is also significant cor-
relation, whereby we find that higher wages are strongly negatively correlated with
preferences for consumption and positively correlated with preferences for leisure
(suggesting a backward bending labor supply curve).
11The estimated labor supply and wage equations show the expected signs for the covariates.
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Table 5: Joint estimation results single females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-wages
Part time 0.038 -0.041 -0.075∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
Over time -0.107∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.016
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029)
N 7455 7455 7455 7455 7455
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.465 0.466 0.475 0.477
Log-likelihood -1710 -2228 -2220 -2186 -2176
AIC 3461 4513 4503 4438 4419
BIC 3607 4714 4717 4666 4654
Halton draws 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation
ρC,ln W -0.774∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.088)
ρL,ln W 0.511∗∗∗
(0.107)
Mean 10 % Elasticities
Intensive 0.210 0.259 0.285 0.456 0.575
Extensive 0.308 0.450 0.457 0.789 1.004
Total 0.222 0.283 0.307 0.501 0.631
Aggregated 10 % elasticities
Intensive 0.172 0.200 0.227 0.365 0.461
Extensive 0.030 0.039 0.041 0.063 0.076
Total 0.201 0.239 0.268 0.428 0.537
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Model (1) corresponds to a common two-step estimation
assuming wages as exogeneous. Model (2) estimates preferences
and wages jointly. Model (3) allows in addition wages to depend
on hours of work. Model (4) also allows for correlation between
wages and preferences for consumption. Model (5) extends model
(4) by allowing in addition for correlation between wages and taste
for leisure. Note that table 7 in Appendix B shows the estimation
results for model (5) using different numbers of draws, varying
between 10 and 4,000.
The statistical criteria show that models (3) to (5) clearly outperform model (2)
irrespective of the specific measure.12 Even more importantly, both intensive and ex-
tensive elasticities rise when the model allows for more flexible preference and wage
patterns (compare model (1) to the other four models). In fact, switching from the
most restrictive (1) to the most flexible model (5) more than doubles the estimated
elasticities from above 0.2 to around 0.6—despite using the same data and identify-
12An often used approach to evaluate the performance of different estimators is to run Monte Carlo
simulations. However, in our setting, the (joint) significance of the additional regressors and the
information criteria presented below allow us to conclude whether our flexible model outperforms
the standard approach. In addition, the outcome of the Monte Carlo study depends on the data
generating process. If it is chosen with a complex (without a) correlation structure, it would be
tautological to conclude that the model allowing for correlation performs best (worst).
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ing variation. Indeed, this is strongly in line with the theoretical intuition described
above. Our results show that the usual approach to estimate wages separately and
independently from the labor supply decision neglects important correlation patterns
that determine a households’ response to wage changes, driving elasticities towards
zero. Hence, when allowing for a more flexible specification, microeconometrically
estimated elasticities come closer to macroeconomic ones (Keane, 2011, Chetty et al.,
2011, Keane and Rogerson, 2012). One reason for this could be that the more flexi-
ble model implicitly captures some of the frictions that are seen as key in explaining
these differences. It would be interesting to explicitly incorporate frictions, which are
right now captured, among other things, by, e.g., dummies for different hour cate-
gories, into the structural estimation and compare the findings to our results in future
research.
6 Conclusion
Structural labor supply models are frequently used in the empirical labor supply anal-
ysis for many different purposes. In recent years, it has become a standard procedure
to estimate labor supply decisions as a choice among a set of different hours alterna-
tives or job opportunities. In contrast to this popularity, little is known about how the
numerous modeling assumptions influence the statistical fit, as well as the estimated
labor supply elasticities.
In this paper, we provide an overview of the most important specification issues
and conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis to disentangle the driving factors
behind the results from structural labor supply models. Our results show that even
if the modeling assumptions concerning the direct utility specification increase or
worsen the statistical fit, i.e. the power to explain the observed labor supply behavior,
the models are robust in terms of estimated labor supply elasticities. In contrast,
the models are highly sensitive to changes in the underlying wage distribution, a
mechanisms almost completely neglected in the literature to date. Thus, the question
of whether to use predicted or observed wages for actual workers and whether and
how to integrate the wage prediction error out during the estimation process has a
large and statistically significant impact on the statistical fit of the model and the
estimated labor supply elasticities.
We further tackle this issue and propose an alternative estimation method that
overcomes the restrictive independence assumptions between wages and work prefer-
ences. We allow for correlation between wages and preferences, as well as wage rates
that depend on hours of work. Our results show that there are indeed significant cor-
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relation patterns in both dimension, which were usually ignored in previous empirical
applications. While the standard approach assumes that every worker faces a fixed
wage rate irrespective of hours of work, we find that working part-time significantly
lowers the hourly wage rate by 7 %. Moreover, we find significant correlation between
wages and preferences for both leisure and consumption. Our findings clearly reject
the exogeneity assumptions that are implicitly made in most discrete choice labor
supply applications.
Our findings have important implications for tax policy design. Diamond and Saez
(2011) derive simple formulas for the optimal (top) marginal tax rates based upon la-
bor supply elasticities.13 They assume an elasticity of 0.25 as an “a mid-range estimate
from the empirical literature” which is close to our estimate for the restrictive model.
This leads to an optimal top marginal tax rate of τ = 11+1.5∗0.25 = 72.7 %. However,
an elasticity of 0.6 as found in our most flexible model reduces the optimal tax rate
to 52.6 % bringing it closer to actually observed values (the top labor tax rate in the
US is 42.5 %). While we cannot claim that we have identified the true value for the
labor supply elasticity—which might not even exist—our analysis shows that more
attention should be paid to the specification of structural labor supply models before
using them for policy analysis.
13The formula for the optimal top tax rate is τ = 1−g1−g+ae where g is the marginal social welfare weight
for the top earners, a is the parameter of the Pareto (income) distribution and e is the labor supply
elasticity. Diamond and Saez (2011) assume g = 0 to derive the optimal revenue maximizing top
tax rate and use an estimated Pareto coefficient of 1.5 for the US.
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A Joint estimation
For the joint maximum likelihood estimation in Section 5, we use a Box-Cox trans-
formed utility specification. Thus, the systematic utility of individual n choosing
alternative j is given by:
v
(
Cnj, Lj
)
=
(
xnβ′1 + βC,n
)
C(λC)nj + β2C
(λC)
nj L
(λL)
j +
(
xnβ′3 + βL,n
)
L(λL)j
+ βFC,n1(hj>0) + β41(hj=20) + β51(hj=40) (9)
with C(λC)nj and L
(λL)
j defined as:
C(λC)nj =

C∗nj
λC−1
λC
if λC 6= 0
ln C∗nj if λC = 0
L(λL)j =

L∗j
λL−1
λL
if λL 6= 0
ln L∗j if λL = 0
(10)
C∗nj = Cnj/1000 L
∗
nj = Lnj/80 (11)
and wages given by the wage equation:
ln wn = znγ′ + ew,n (12)
We further assume that preferences (βC,n, βL,n, βFC,n) and wages (the residual ew,n
of the log-wage equation) are multivariate normally distributed:
ew,n
βC,n
βL,n
βFC,n
 ∼ N
µ =

0
βC
βL
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 ,Ω =
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σ2w
σC,w σ
2
C
σL,w σC,L σ
2
L
0 σC,FC σL,FC σ2FC
 = LL′
 (13)
Instead of estimating the variance-covariance-matrix directly, we estimate its Cholesky
decomposition L. As we cannot directly simulate from the joint distribution, we draw
R Halton sequences µ(r)i,n (i = 1, . . . , 4, r = 1, . . . , R) from a standard normal and
transform them accordingly to the estimated factorization L:
eˆ
(r)
w,n
βˆ
(r)
C,n
βˆ
(r)
L,n
βˆ
(r)
FC,n
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0
βˆC
βˆL
βˆFC
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
lˆw,w 0 0 0
lˆC,w lˆC,C 0 0
lˆL,w 0 lˆL,L 0
0 0 0 lˆFC,FC


µ
(r)
1,n
µ
(r)
2,n
µ
(r)
3,n
µ
(r)
4,n
 (14)
We use the actual wage equation residual if the wage is observed, thus µ(r)1,n =
30
(
ln wn − xw,n βˆ′w
)/
σw and µ
(r)
i,n ∼ N (0, 1) (i = 2, 3, 4). If individual n is unemployed
and we do not observe her wage rate, we also draw her log-wage equation residual
from a normal distribution, µ(r)1,n ∼ N (0, 1).
Using a simplified version of the above model makes it possible to show how the
commonly neglected covariance terms influence resulting labor supply elasticities.
Consider the utility function outlined in equation (9) and set β1, β2, β3, βFC,n, β4,
β5, λC and λL equal to zero and give βL,n zero variance for simplicity. Now let us
assume that leisure is the residual of total time of the week minus hours worked
(Lj = T − Hj) and consumption is a function of wages, hours and non-labor income
(Cnj = wnHj + Rn). The agent’s problem can subsequently be written as:
max
H
βC,n ln Cn,j + βL,n ln Lj = max
H
βC,n ln(wnHj + Rn) + βL,n ln(T − Hj). (15)
It follows from utility maximization that the labor supply function is given by:
H∗n =
βC,nT
βL,n + βC,n
− βL,nRn
βL,n + βC,n
w−1n . (16)
We can derive individual labor supply elasticities as:
eH,w,n =
∂H∗n
∂wn
wn
H∗n
=
βL,nRn/T
βC,nwn − βL,nRn/T . (17)
The elasticity depends inversely on the product of preferences for consumption βC,n
and hourly wage rates wn. Moreover, βC,n and ln wn are assumed to be bivariate nor-
mally distributed (see equation (13)). It follows that labor supply elasticities decrease
with increasing covariance between wages and consumption preferences.
B Joint estimation results
Table 6: Joint estimation results single females—full results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Preferences
C× Age 0.678∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.315) (0.184) (0.213) (0.221)
C× Age2 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
C× Handicap 0.527 1.457 1.194 1.507 1.675
(1.550) (2.044) (1.627) (1.936) (1.909)
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C -8.253∗∗ -7.741 -7.740∗∗ -1.031 -0.194
(3.910) (4.746) (3.458) (3.964) (3.936)
C× L 0.801∗∗ 1.042∗ 0.491 0.797∗ -0.352
(0.354) (0.542) (0.392) (0.466) (0.475)
λC 0.255 0.164 0.302 0.485∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗
(0.183) (0.140) (0.202) (0.120) (0.130)
L× Age 0.093 0.075 0.104 0.059 0.043
(0.095) (0.105) (0.084) (0.116) (0.103)
L× Age2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L× Handicap 0.440 0.888 0.592 0.809 0.610
(0.785) (0.922) (0.751) (1.071) (0.938)
L× Care 2.624∗∗ 3.700∗ 2.749∗∗ 4.337∗∗ 4.000∗∗
(1.284) (1.890) (1.361) (1.938) (1.787)
L× Children2 1.536∗ 1.847 1.575∗ 2.113∗ 2.054∗
(0.894) (1.135) (0.892) (1.185) (1.099)
L× Children3,6 0.456 0.401 0.436 0.220 0.233
(0.306) (0.358) (0.296) (0.372) (0.333)
L× Children7,16 0.402∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.364∗ 0.348∗
(0.160) (0.192) (0.153) (0.213) (0.197)
L -1.296 0.382 -1.204 1.448 2.787
(1.875) (1.867) (1.491) (2.317) (2.025)
λL -0.775∗∗ -0.988∗∗∗ -0.754∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.315) (0.275) (0.308) (0.320)
Restrictions
Fixed costs -0.745∗∗ -1.000∗∗∗ -1.109∗∗∗ -1.078∗∗∗ -1.049∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.232) (0.185) (0.209) (0.206)
1(h = 20) -0.071 -0.063 -0.029 -0.070 -0.124
(0.123) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128)
1(h = 40) 0.811∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.407∗∗
(0.089) (0.095) (0.128) (0.195) (0.201)
Log-wages
Tenure 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure2/100 -0.089∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
University 0.295∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029)
Unskilled -0.259∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.051) (0.047)
East -0.287∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
Foreigner -0.072 -0.070 -0.060 -0.045
(0.072) (0.071) (0.065) (0.059)
Handicapped -0.192∗∗ -0.205∗∗ -0.195∗∗ -0.179∗∗
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(0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.083)
Part time 0.038 -0.041 -0.075∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
Over time -0.107∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.016
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029)
Constant 2.169∗∗∗ 2.170∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗ 2.251∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Cholesky matrix
lln W 0.450∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
lC,ln W -2.249∗∗∗ -2.040∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.529)
lC 0.249 2.838∗∗ 1.361∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗
(1.158) (1.127) (0.504) (0.682) (0.723)
lL,ln W 0.957∗∗∗
(0.286)
lL 0.286 1.496∗∗∗ 0.095 1.605∗∗ 1.607∗∗∗
(0.889) (0.543) (0.382) (0.684) (0.487)
lFC 0.939 0.842 0.220 0.413 0.357
(0.730) (0.614) (0.477) (0.570) (0.575)
N 7455 7455 7455 7455 7455
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.465 0.466 0.475 0.477
Log-likelihood -1710 -2228 -2220 -2186 -2176
AIC 3461 4513 4503 4438 4419
BIC 3607 4714 4717 4666 4654
Halton draws 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation
ρC,ln W -0.774∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.088)
ρL,ln W 0.511∗∗∗
(0.107)
Aggregated 10 % elasticities
Intensive 0.172 0.200 0.227 0.365 0.461
Extensive 0.030 0.039 0.041 0.063 0.076
Total 0.201 0.239 0.268 0.428 0.537
Mean 10 % Elasticities
Intensive 0.210 0.259 0.285 0.456 0.575
Extensive 0.308 0.450 0.457 0.789 1.004
Total 0.222 0.283 0.307 0.501 0.631
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Joint estimation results single females—sensitivity of model (5) w.r.t. number of Halton draws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Preferences
C× Age 0.463∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗ 0.546∗∗ 0.543∗∗ 0.540∗∗ 0.540∗∗
(0.168) (0.221) (0.211) (0.219) (0.217) (0.215) (0.215)
C× Age2 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
C× Handicap 1.525 1.675 1.379 1.309 1.250 1.264 1.299
(1.590) (1.909) (1.846) (1.855) (1.799) (1.808) (1.818)
C -1.943 -0.194 0.458 0.829 0.867 0.683 0.742
(3.312) (3.936) (3.891) (4.023) (3.998) (3.960) (3.969)
C× L -0.286 -0.352 -0.311 -0.324 -0.313 -0.306 -0.312
(0.495) (0.475) (0.459) (0.467) (0.476) (0.472) (0.474)
λC 0.315∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗
(0.148) (0.130) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) (0.136) (0.136)
L× Age 0.060 0.043 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018
(0.106) (0.103) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
L× Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L× Handicap 0.582 0.610 0.451 0.384 0.345 0.357 0.380
(0.962) (0.938) (0.895) (0.869) (0.830) (0.849) (0.855)
L× Care 3.263∗∗ 4.000∗∗ 3.769∗∗ 3.821∗∗ 3.819∗∗ 3.795∗∗ 3.805∗∗
(1.423) (1.787) (1.697) (1.733) (1.733) (1.714) (1.716)
L× Children2 1.657∗ 2.054∗ 2.050∗ 2.088∗ 2.091∗ 2.076∗ 2.079∗
(0.879) (1.099) (1.073) (1.096) (1.095) (1.084) (1.085)
L× Children3,6 0.159 0.233 0.290 0.319 0.312 0.303 0.304
(0.302) (0.333) (0.340) (0.357) (0.354) (0.350) (0.351)
L× Children7,16 0.267 0.348∗ 0.362∗ 0.360∗ 0.361∗ 0.364∗ 0.362∗
(0.169) (0.197) (0.194) (0.194) (0.193) (0.195) (0.194)
L 1.397 2.787 3.010 3.201 3.195 3.113 3.137
(2.055) (2.025) (1.991) (2.037) (2.026) (2.017) (2.022)
λL -0.580∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -1.067∗∗∗ -1.116∗∗∗ -1.115∗∗∗ -1.090∗∗∗ -1.091∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.320) (0.335) (0.333) (0.339) (0.338) (0.335)
Restrictions
Fixed costs -0.949∗∗∗ -1.049∗∗∗ -1.076∗∗∗ -1.088∗∗∗ -1.086∗∗∗ -1.081∗∗∗ -1.081∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.206) (0.201) (0.202) (0.202) (0.201) (0.201)
1(h = 20) -0.094 -0.124 -0.128 -0.136 -0.136 -0.131 -0.132
(0.124) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128)
1(h = 40) 0.497∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.428∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.423∗∗
(0.159) (0.201) (0.196) (0.200) (0.200) (0.199) (0.199)
Log-wages
Tenure 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure2/100 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
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(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
University 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Unskilled -0.258∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
East -0.209∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Foreigner -0.053 -0.045 -0.047 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Handicapped -0.184∗∗ -0.179∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.173∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.174∗∗
(0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Part time -0.069∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.078∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Over time -0.052 -0.016 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008
(0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Constant 2.259∗∗∗ 2.251∗∗∗ 2.252∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Cholesky matrix
lln W 0.444∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
lC,ln W -1.244∗∗∗ -2.040∗∗∗ -1.959∗∗∗ -2.050∗∗∗ -2.057∗∗∗ -2.021∗∗∗ -2.023∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.529) (0.494) (0.534) (0.525) (0.520) (0.514)
lC 0.789∗ 1.982∗∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗ 1.925∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.723) (0.692) (0.748) (0.719) (0.712) (0.706)
lL,ln W 0.820∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.286) (0.283) (0.295) (0.295) (0.289) (0.290)
lL 0.555 1.607∗∗∗ 1.532∗∗∗ 1.609∗∗∗ 1.607∗∗∗ 1.572∗∗∗ 1.578∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.487) (0.459) (0.495) (0.487) (0.475) (0.476)
lFC 0.284 0.357 0.084 0.051 -0.054 0.005 -0.002
(0.310) (0.575) (0.663) (0.704) (0.677) (0.671) (0.675)
N 7455 7455 7455 7455 7455 7455 7455
Pseudo R2 0.476 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.477
Log-likelihood -2179 -2176 -2176 -2176 -2175 -2176 -2176
AIC 4427 4419 4420 4419 4419 4419 4419
BIC 4662 4654 4655 4655 4654 4654 4654
Halton draws 10 50 250 500 1000 2000 4000
Correlation
ρC,ln W -0.845∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.732∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.088) (0.095) (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
ρL,ln W 0.828∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.107) (0.103) (0.099) (0.098) (0.101) (0.100)
Aggregated 10 % elasticities
Intensive 0.463 0.461 0.463 0.462 0.463 0.463 0.463
Extensive 0.074 0.076 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
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Total 0.537 0.537 0.540 0.539 0.540 0.540 0.540
Mean 10 % Elasticities
Intensive 0.573 0.575 0.577 0.580 0.578 0.578 0.578
Extensive 0.922 1.004 1.005 1.011 1.012 1.008 1.009
Total 0.618 0.631 0.635 0.638 0.636 0.636 0.636
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Marginal impact of modeling assumptions (CPS)
Fit 10 % own wage elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility function
Quadratic 0.640∗∗∗ 0.217 0.207 0.210
(0.062) (0.183) (0.185) (0.185)
Number of Halton draws -0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Hours restrictions
Part-time restrictions -1.855∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.397∗ 0.403∗
(0.089) (0.188) (0.189) (0.190)
Fixed costs -1.279∗∗∗ 0.192 0.125 0.142
(0.067) (0.120) (0.104) (0.106)
Observed heterogeneity
in C only -0.138∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.078∗∗
(0.015) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031)
in L only -0.258∗∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.080∗ -0.076∗
(0.026) (0.036) (0.044) (0.042)
in C and L -0.309∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.094∗ -0.097∗∗
(0.027) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043)
Unobserved heterogeneity
in C only 0.067∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.013) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043)
in L only 0.070∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.007) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
in C and L 0.046∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.009) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035)
in C and L (with correl.) 0.021∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.007) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026)
Wage imputation
Full sample, no correction -0.111∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.284) (0.300) (0.299)
Full sample, 1 random draw 0.025 0.338 0.428∗ 0.413∗
(0.046) (0.244) (0.229) (0.230)
Non-workers, 1 random draw 0.030 -0.329 -0.237 -0.255
(0.053) (0.362) (0.362) (0.363)
Constant 0.832∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗ -0.864∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.271) (0.270) (0.270)
Labor supply types Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4305 3439 3439 3439
R2 0.820 0.353 0.340 0.344
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the
individual wage rates by 10 percent and aggregating individual labor supply
responses. Dependent variables have been standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0
indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is
negatively related to the statistical fit of the model—the better the fit, the lower
the AIC. Standard errors clusted by labor supply group and wage imputation
procedure. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Partial impact of modeling assumptions (SOEP)
Fit 10 % own wage elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility function
Translog -0.045∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.047
(0.024) (0.021) (0.045) (0.040)
Quadratic 0.135∗∗∗ 0.067∗ -0.054 -0.037
(0.013) (0.039) (0.053) (0.046)
Box-Cox -0.093∗∗∗ 0.061 0.094∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.017) (0.049) (0.034) (0.034)
Welfare stigma 0.965∗∗∗ 0.051 0.072 0.071
(0.076) (0.061) (0.047) (0.042)
Number of Halton draws -0.013∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Hours restrictions
None 1.376∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.067) (0.038) (0.039)
Part-time restrictions -1.110∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.013 0.035
(0.052) (0.041) (0.024) (0.026)
Fixed costs -0.244∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023)
Observed heterogeneity
None 0.398∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.035∗ -0.030
(0.063) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021)
in C only -0.046∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.024∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
in L only -0.121∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
in C and L -0.235∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010)
Unobserved heterogeneity
None 0.057 0.090 0.125 0.122
(0.040) (0.110) (0.117) (0.117)
in C only 0.029∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.013 0.023
(0.015) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
in L only 0.050 -0.123 -0.032 -0.047
(0.040) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
in C and L -0.035∗∗ 0.039 0.006 0.011
(0.015) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
in C and L (with correl.) -0.102∗∗ -0.128 -0.124 -0.127
(0.039) (0.102) (0.111) (0.110)
Wage imputation
Full sample imputation -0.498∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.288) (0.294) (0.296)
Error integrated out -0.037 0.267 0.190 0.207
(0.125) (0.351) (0.359) (0.362)
Full sample, no correction -0.720∗∗∗ 1.921∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.145) (0.144) (0.142)
Full sample, error integrated out -0.334∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.239) (0.253) (0.254)
Full sample, 1 random draw 0.143 -0.599∗∗ -0.554∗∗ -0.569∗∗
(0.089) (0.237) (0.258) (0.257)
Non-workers, error integrated out 0.269∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗ -0.606∗∗ -0.602∗∗
(0.094) (0.227) (0.230) (0.231)
N 16,730 13,219 13,219 13,219
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the indi-
vidual wage rates by 10 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses.
Standard errors clusted by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Marginal impact, aggregated 1 % elasticities (SOEP)
Fit 1 % own wage elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.030 0.043
(0.023) (0.028) (0.050) (0.043)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.133∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.026) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035)
Welfare stigma 0.968∗∗∗ -0.028 0.084 0.071
(0.076) (0.084) (0.053) (0.044)
Number of Halton draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours restrictions
Part-time restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.071) (0.038) (0.041)
Fixed costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.068) (0.039) (0.041)
Observed heterogeneity
in C only -0.335∗∗∗ -0.057 0.060∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022)
in L only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.032 0.041∗ 0.041∗
(0.061) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023)
in C and L -0.475∗∗∗ -0.002 0.016 0.013
(0.070) (0.044) (0.020) (0.022)
Unobserved heterogeneity
in C only 0.005 -0.009 -0.054∗ -0.048
(0.014) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030)
in L only 0.005 -0.085∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.040
(0.013) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
in C and L -0.041∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.068∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
in C and L (with correl.) -0.119∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.092∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Wage imputation
Full sample, no correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗ 2.245∗∗∗ 2.248∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.117) (0.088) (0.084)
Full sample, error integrated out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.103) (0.114) (0.117)
Full sample, 1 random draw -0.104∗∗ 0.086 0.102 0.100
(0.049) (0.085) (0.078) (0.079)
Non-workers, error integrated out 0.000 0.054 0.046 0.048
(0.067) (0.062) (0.035) (0.038)
Non-workers, 1 random draw 0.070 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.028) (0.032)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.930∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.104) (0.084) (0.087)
Labor supply types Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16730 13219 13219 13219
R2 0.854 0.816 0.880 0.889
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the in-
dividual wage rates by 1 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses.
Dependent variables have been standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an in-
crease of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is negatively related to
the statistical fit of the model—the better the fit, the lower the AIC. Standard er-
rors clusted by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Marginal impact, mean 10 % elasticities (SOEP)
Fit 10 % own wage elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.022 0.041
(0.023) (0.033) (0.047) (0.038)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.101∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.034) (0.033)
Welfare stigma 0.968∗∗∗ -0.026 0.034 0.026
(0.076) (0.063) (0.045) (0.039)
Number of Halton draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours restrictions
Part-time restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.089) (0.045) (0.056)
Fixed costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.087) (0.044) (0.053)
Observed heterogeneity
in C only -0.335∗∗∗ 0.037 0.048∗ 0.046
(0.057) (0.036) (0.024) (0.027)
in L only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.040) (0.022) (0.027)
in C and L -0.475∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.036 0.074∗∗
(0.070) (0.053) (0.022) (0.029)
Unobserved heterogeneity
in C only 0.005 0.001 -0.046 -0.036
(0.014) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029)
in L only 0.005 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.041
(0.013) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
in C and L -0.041∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.059∗∗ -0.053∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
in C and L (with correl.) -0.119∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Wage imputation
Full sample, no correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.130∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.106) (0.092) (0.089)
Full sample, error integrated out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.134) (0.132) (0.140)
Full sample, 1 random draw -0.104∗∗ 0.058 0.146 0.122
(0.049) (0.049) (0.087) (0.078)
Non-workers, error integrated out 0.000 0.035 0.062 0.057
(0.067) (0.053) (0.042) (0.043)
Non-workers, 1 random draw 0.070 -0.164∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.966∗∗∗ -0.749∗∗∗ -0.814∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.119) (0.091) (0.097)
Labor supply types Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16730 13219 13219 13219
R2 0.854 0.820 0.876 0.883
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the in-
dividual wage rates by 10 percent and taking the mean individual labor supply re-
sponse. Dependent variables have been standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates
an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is negatively related
to the statistical fit of the model—the better the fit, the lower the AIC. Standard er-
rors clusted by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Marginal impact, median 10 % elasticities (SOEP)
Fit 10 % own wage elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.079 0.098∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.063) (0.048)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.084∗∗ 0.042 0.056
(0.026) (0.036) (0.044) (0.040)
Welfare stigma 0.968∗∗∗ 0.001 0.062 0.059
(0.076) (0.059) (0.068) (0.062)
Number of Halton draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hours restrictions
Part-time restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.046 0.116∗
(0.082) (0.084) (0.069) (0.058)
Fixed costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.112 0.181∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.085) (0.076) (0.063)
Observed heterogeneity
in C only -0.335∗∗∗ 0.046 0.010 0.013
(0.057) (0.035) (0.023) (0.022)
in L only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.001
(0.061) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023)
in C and L -0.475∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.044) (0.025) (0.024)
Unobserved heterogeneity
in C only 0.005 -0.020 -0.098∗∗ -0.088∗∗
(0.014) (0.027) (0.038) (0.036)
in L only 0.005 -0.077∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.017
(0.013) (0.026) (0.038) (0.036)
in C and L -0.041∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029)
in C and L (with correl.) -0.119∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036)
Wage imputation
Full sample, no correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.169∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.098) (0.123) (0.112)
Full sample, error integrated out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.390∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.140) (0.106) (0.103)
Full sample, 1 random draw -0.104∗∗ 0.060 0.227 0.199
(0.049) (0.053) (0.140) (0.127)
Non-workers, error integrated out 0.000 0.042 0.013 0.021
(0.067) (0.050) (0.035) (0.032)
Non-workers, 1 random draw 0.070 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.033) (0.047) (0.042)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.940∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.114) (0.104) (0.096)
Labor supply types Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16730 13219 13219 13219
R2 0.854 0.832 0.769 0.806
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the in-
dividual wage rates by 10 percent and taking the median individual labor supply
response. Dependent variables have been standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indi-
cates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is negatively
related to the statistical fit of the model—the better the fit, the lower the AIC. Stan-
dard errors clusted by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
42
